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Abstruct. This paper presents evidence that firm-level productivity increases when the 
relative wage rises, or the level of unemployment rises. Both facts are consistent with the 
efficiency wage model. Moreover, there is support for the idea that an increase in the 
sector’s wage with respect to the previous year also increases productivity. We obtain the 
empirical evidence through a double-hurdle model. We use this estimation technique 
because it can be established that the differences in productivity between sectors could 
be explained by differences in effort. It means that some of the industrial sectors of the 
Spanish economy may pay wage premia while others do not. We also test this implication 
through panel data. 
Introduction 
The efficiency wage models are all based on a convincing and 
coherent explanation of why firms may find it unprofitable to cut wages 
in the presence of involuntary unemployment. According to this 
hypothesis, labour productivity depends on the real wage paid by the 
firm. These approaches identify four benefits of higher wage payments: 
reduced avoidance of work by employees due to a higher cost of job 
loss, lower turnover, improvement in the job quality of job applicants, 
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and improved morale. In this paper, we focus on the predictions of the 
shirking and the sociofogicul models. The novelty that our work 
incorporates is to estimate the effect of the wage premium on 
productivity throughout a model of censored dependent variable and 
panel data. 
The traditional shirking model is based on the imperfect information 
that firms have concerning the effort of their employees. Monitoring 
individual performance is assumed to be impossible, or very costly, and 
the punishment for low performance is limited by legal constraints. As 
an incentive for workers to work instead of shirking, firms may find it 
profitable to raise wages. This attitude increases the cost of job loss for 
the worker in two ways. First, because this wage is higher than the wage 
paid by other firms. Second, it is above the market-clearing level and 
will thus generate involuntary unemployment and also diminish his 
expected outside earnings. In the simplest version, according to Shapiro 
and Stiglitz (1984) workers and firms are assumed to be homogeneous 
and, as firms are identical, they would all find it profitable to raise 
wages. Relative wages will stay constant, and only unemployment will 
act as a discipline device, increasing the cost of job loss. 
The sociological model considers that workers’ effort depends on 
whether they believe their employer is treating them fairly. If the wage is 
perceived as just, workers’ morale will improve, their feelings of loyalty 
will increase, and so will their productivity. Especially important 
perhaps, are recent models that attempt to formalize the essence of 
actual wage setting in which interpersonal comparisons among workers 
seem to override other considerations (Akerlof, 1982). These models 
stress the productivity consequences of worker morale, wage norms, 
and subjective concepts of fairness among workers. Maintenance of 
such norms is thought to support the important subjective beliefs of 
workers that they are being treated fairly. Workers paid noticeably less 
than what they think they deserve are thought to be much less 
productive. 
A whole family of models have been built around this basic frame- 
work by varying what is assumed measurable, at what cost, and the 
payment schedules that are feasible. Krueger and Summers (1986) 
estimate standard wage equations using cross- section data on 
individuals. They used data from the US Current Population Surveys 
for 1974,1979 and 1984. The industry and occupation variables were 
found to be relatively important explanatory variables for variation in 
earnings. Murphy and Tope1 (1987) also use longitudinal data, and 
produce different results from those obtained using cross-section data. 
Gibbons and Katz (1989) point out that the previous evidence based on 
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longitudinal data only deals with the objection that inter-industry wage 
differential proxy for unobserved ability differences if each worker’s 
productive ability is valued equally in different industries. In the 
Gibbons and Katz model, information about ability is imperfect ex-ante, 
but improves ex-post, i.e. the market observes a noisy signal about each 
worker’s ability at the time of hiring, but more is learnt through actual 
subsequent productivity. The workers who are subsequently discovered 
to belong to the wrong industry then move. 
In this paper, we attempt to test the efficiency wage model by 
examining some of its predictions for the determinants of a firm’s 
productivity. Efficiency wage models require that changes in unemploy- 
ment increase a firm’s productivity. This is in contrast to a neoclassical 
production function, where outside unemployment plays no such role. 
Similarly, if workers are homogeneous, differences in the relative wage 
paid should not, in a standard neoclassical model, affect the firm’s out- 
put. We also find some evidence for a modified efficiency wage model 
where workers do not merely compare their wage with outside opportu- 
nities, but also allow their comparison standard to rise with past 
achievements. 
In the short run, we estimate a function which reflects the effect of 
the wage premium paid by the sector on the average product of labour. 
The firms cannot observe the effort of each worker; they only know 
the average productivity of labour. In our model, we assume that 
average productivity of labour depends on effort and capital stock by 
worker. 
The effort is unobserved and, for this reason, we use a censored 
dependent variable model to predict the existence of this wage 
premium. We assume that if the industrial sectors of the Spanish 
economy pay efficiency wages, they will have a positive labour-aug- 
menting production function. The factor of augmentation, in this con- 
text, is the effort. This paper presents a new possibility for testing the 
implications of this kind of model. 
1. The theoretical approach 
1.1. The basicframework 
The basic framework in an efficiency wage model starts by consider- 
ing an economy with identical and perfectly competitive firms, each 
firm having a short-run production function: 
Y = f [ e ( w ) L I  [ I 1  
0 Fondadone Giacorno BrodoliN 1995. 
256 Sinchez - Urbano - Oni 
where L is the number of employees, e is the effort per worker, and 
w is the real wage. A profit-maximizing firm can hire all the labour it 
wants at the wages it chooses to offer. The firm will choose the wage 
to maximize profits. The profit function is: 
n =f[e( w )  L , K ]  - wL - rK PI 
The F.O.C. for maximization are: 
6l-I - = h e - w = O  
6L [31 
dividing [4] by [3] we obtain Solow’s condition.’ The firm will hire 
labour until the point where the effective marginal productivity of 
labour (fie) is equal to the wage, and, for this, will offer the wage that 
fulfill Solow’s condition. 
The relationship between effort and real wage has to be positive in an 
efficiency wage model. We can assume an effort function as it appears in 
Figure 1. We can suppose that w, is the minimum real wage, and w* is 
the profit maximizing wage; at this point, the elasticity of the effort with 
respect to the wage is unity. The effort function is convex for values 
below w*, which implies that effort is increasing more quickly than 
wages and that there is a strong wage capture. In the concave area, for 
values above w*, the effort increases less than wages and thus there is a 
weak wage capture. No firm will be situated in the convex region. 
We are assuming that the industrial sectors of the Spanish economy 
are interested in the effectiveness of labour more than in the number of 
workers they hire, and are thus willing to pay above the opportunity 
wage of their labour force. Even if all the sectors pay efficiency wages, 
nothing guarantees that would they pay the same equilibrium wage. 
Competition should weed out substantially different costs per efficient 
unit, forcing similar and competitive firms into a common type of 
techno-institutional efficiency that minimizes costs per efficiency unit. 
In this way, a cross-section of competing firms should satisfy Solow’s 
condition. In Figure 2, we observe that the tangent that minimizes costs 
per efficient unit for different firms all lie on the same ray from the 
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Figure 1. The effort function 
origin. This would seem to be more likely for competing firms facing 
similar technological and institutional constraints. 
1.2. The average productivity of labour 
Our main goal is to estimate the existence of wage premium for the 
industrial sector of the Spanish economy. To this end, we first have to 
derive the conditions that allows us to apply such a model. The firms 
cannot observe the effort of each worker, but they know the average 
productivity of their labour force. In the short run, we assume that the 
average productivity of labour depends on: 
where e is the effort and K / L  is the capital stock by worker. Also, the 
level of effort in each firm will depend on the real wage, w, paid: 
e=e(  w )  171 
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Figure 2. Same cost per efficient unit 
W* 
2 
W* 
1 
Differentiating 161 we obtain. 
operating in [8] and substituting 6e/6w by e' we have: 
If we multiply the first term of the right-hand side of [9] by (e /w)(  w/e)we 
can write: 
where g ,  is the first derivative of the average product of labour with 
respect to effort, E; is the elasticity of the effort with respect to the 
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wage, E , ~  is the elasticity of the labour demand with respect to the 
wage, and g, is the first derivative of the average productivity of labour 
with respect to the capital stock by worker. 
2. Data, methodology and estimation 
Our basic data source is published in the Spanish Industrial Enquiry 
(SIE) for 89 sectors of the economy, carried out by the National 
Institute of Statistics (INE) and FundacMn Empresa Publica. The 
precise data definitions are discussed in the Data Appendix. For 
estimation we use 8 1 sectors, 
Our main goal is to estimate the existence of wage premia, which can 
be done by a cross-section estimation. We group sectors with the same 
ratio ( K / L )  in order to eliminate the influence of this variable on the 
average productivity of labour. If one sector, for example i, has an 
average productivity of labour above the average of its group, it is 
because the level of effort of its labour force is also bigger. 
We group the sectors by two methods. The first tries to get the small 
deviation about the capital stock by the worker’s ratio. With the second, 
we are more interested in grouping the sectors around the same kind of 
activity. In this case, the deviations about capital stock are bigger but we 
can obtain the same group of sector for all the years. The second case 
also allows us to estimate through panel data. 
Generally, we suppose the average productivity of labour of the 
sector i depends on: 
[YILI,=g[e,, (mil [ 1 1 1  
where [ Y/L] ,  is the average productivity of labour of the sector i, el is the 
level of effort and (R/L ), is the capital by worker. Defining the effort as 
a function that depends on the variables: 
el = e( w,, vwrund,  pempd, , vempd, ) [I21 
where w,: is the real wage by worker for sector i; vwrund,: is a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if the real wage has increased in sector i with 
respect to the previous year and zero otherwise; pempd,: is a dummy 
that takes value 1 if the number of workers in sector i is greater than 
average; vempd,: is a dummy that takes value 1 if the employment in 
sector i has increased with respect to the previous year’s employment. 
The relationship between effort and real wages has to be positive in a 
efficiency wage model. In this context, firms pay above the market- 
clearing level to increase productivity. In our model, the wage does not 
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clear the labour market: instead, we use the average wage paid by the 
group of sectors to which the ratio ( K / L  ) is similar. We consider that the 
average wage acts as a proxy of the opportunity wage of the sector’s 
labour force. 
Through vwrand, we try to idenw the effect of an increase in the real 
wage with respect to the previous year. The efficiency wage model 
assumes that workers either compare themselves with others in a similar 
position, or with their expected opportunities if they left the sector. 
There is evidence that people become accustomed to a certain state, 
good or bad, and therefore tend to be influenced by events that are 
better or worse than normal. In this case, we test the hypothesis of the 
sociological model, and this dummy could peak the treatment of the 
sector: the relationship with the effort thus has to be positive. 
With pempd, we reflect the difficulties of monitoring when the 
number of workers is high. Because we do not have a direct 
measurement of this variable, we have to construct one which considers 
differences with respect to the average of workers for all the sectors in 
the group. We expect that, if the sector is above average, the relationship 
with effort wiU be negative, because in this case it is more difficult to 
control the work. 
While differences in human capital may account for the positive 
influence of wages on productivity, it is less likely to explain why 
variations in unemployment would improve productivity. Thus, with 
vempdi we try to measure changes in employment with respect to the 
previous year. We do not have any unemployment in the SJE; 
consequently, we use this variable as a proxy for the effect of unemploy- 
ment on the effort. In a efficiency wage model, the unemployment acts 
as a discipline device: if it increases, we also expect higher effort 
(keeping the wage constant), so with this dummy we expect a negative 
relationship with respect to effort. 
We are interested in the sectors of the SIE which we think can pay 
wage premia. If some sectors do so, it is because they are interested in 
capturing effort through wage, and a labour-aumenting production 
function does exist. These sectors do not know the effort function of 
their labour force but, instead, they observe that an above average 
increase in the wage will increase the productivity of the labour, which 
will also be higher than average. To discriminate between the sectors 
that pay these wage premia and those that do not we made a rule with 
respect to average labour productivity. We suppose that the sectors with 
productivity above the group average will pay wage premia and those 
with one below average will not. Furthermore, we suppose that if the 
sectors do not have a labour-aumenting production function, e will be 
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equal to one and expression [l] will become a standard production 
function. In this case, the sector will have an average labour productivity 
below the group average. The aim is to see whether differences in 
productivity can be explained by differences in wages. To this end, we 
censor the data, giving zeros to the sectors with negative differences 
compared to the average, and keeping the value of those with a positive 
difference. 
Now we define the average product of the first group, j ,  as: 
( Y/L)i* =g[ei*, (KIL)i*l ~ 3 1  
where ( Y/L): is the mean of the average product of labour of group j, 
e: is the effort of group j ,  and (K/L): is the mean of the stock of 
capital by worker for the same group. 
We assume that the effort function of each group depends on the 
average wage paid by its group. Then we subtract [13] from [ll] to 
obtain: 
( Y/L 1;- ( Y/L 1: = Ae;, ( K / L  ) i l -  g[e,*, (K/L):l 
y..= Y Ae.pL.pK..l-P Y Y Y  ~ 5 1  
y../L..=Ae.p[K../L..)'-s Y Y  Y 11 Y [I61 
~ 4 1  
To estimate equation [14] we can suppose a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with constant returns to scale. The production function of group i 
that belongs to group j is thus: 
whose average product of labour can be written as: 
We assume the level of production of group j can also be expressed 
throughout a Cobb-Douglas production function with the same 
characteristic as that of the sector. The average productivity of the 
labour force of the group j is thus: 
yi/ Lj = Ael[ K,/Lj] -0 ~171 
Subtracting [ 171 from [ 161, we obtain the difference between the average 
productivity of labour from the sector to the group, which is a function 
of the stock of capital by worker and the level of the effort: 
The groups have been built in a way that allows us to assume that the 
average stock of capital by worker is equal for the sector and for the 
group. We can thus write equation [ 181 as: 
To express the differences in productivity in differences in effort, we 
assume the labour factor has constant return in the short run (B=  1). 
yu/Lv- yi/Lj=Aevs[K,i/L,i]'-s-Ael~Kj/Lj]l-B [181 
yOlLq - x/Lj = A[ Kj/Lj]' -qe,g - el]  ~ 9 1  
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With this assumption, we implicitly assume the average productivity of 
labour is homogeneous of degree one in effort, and the degree of 
homogeneity with respect to the ( K / L )  ratio is zero. We can assume 
homogeneity of degree zero in ( K / L )  because inside each group this 
ratio is equal for the entire sector. 
Assuming both functions are homogeneous of degree one in effort 
and of degree zero in the stock of capital by worker, we can write [19] 
as: 
Y ~ I  /Ly - y/ IL] = 4 eij - el 1 [201 
We suppose the g's function linear in effort. In [20]  the difference in 
productivity of one sector, for example i, and the average of its group, 
for example j ,  is thus related to the difference in the effort of the sector 
and that of the group. 
It is also important to define the effort function that appears in 
equation [ 121. We assume a linear function for the effort in the short run, 
which can be expressed as: 
ell = a,, + a ,  wt1 + a ,  vwrand, + a,pempd, + a,vempd, [211 
Substituting [21] in [20]  and assuming the level of the effort of the group 
depends on the mean of the wage paid for all the sectors belonging to 
the same group, we obtain: 
Y ~ ] / ~ , - Y , / ~ ] = ~ , + ~ , ~ , + ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i J +  a,pempd, 
+ a,vempd, + as wl [221 
In equation [22] there could be an estimation bias €or the existence of 
differences in the ( K / L  ) ratio among groups of sectors. To avoid this, we 
reinforce the estimation of equation [22] with another estimation where 
the sample is grouped by the second method, because in this case there 
are differences in the ( K / L )  ratio between the sector and the group, 
even if small. With the introduction of the ( K / L  ) ratio, we can avoid an 
omitted variable possibility. 
To allow for this possibility, we start taking logarithms of [16] and 
[ 171 and, after subtracting both expressions, we obtain: 
ln[Y,,lq - wJ/LJ)  = B[ln e, - ell + ( 1  - 8"(K,/4,) 
- w q L J ) I  ~ 3 1  
~ 4 1  
The effort function used for the regression of [23]  will be: 
e,] = exp( a,, + a ,  w,, + a,vwrand, + a,pempd, + a,vempd,) 
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Equation [23] is more general and allows us to check whether the results 
obtained with this equation, for the second method, in the panel data 
regression are in line with that obtained with equation [22] for the first 
and second method used in the estimation of the double-hurdle model. 
2.1. The double-hurdle model 
Equation [22] will be used to censure the data and to estimate the 
double-hurdle model. 
The advantage of the first method with respect to the second regards 
the difference between the ratio ( K / L )  of the sector and the stock of 
capital of the group, which in the first case is small. On the other hand, 
its difficulty lies in the configuration of the groups because it is not the 
same for all the years. When we use the second method we lose high 
equality among the ratios (K /L  ).
In general, the censure rule are the same for both methods. The 
difference is only in the mixture of sectors. In any case, we estimate the 
sample obtained in both cases. 
Each model for any censored data source begins by specifying a 
latent regression model. Typically, this will describe the method 
specification in the absence of censoring. In our case, we follow the 
double-hurdle model from Cragg ( 197 1 ), which can be expressed as: 
D i * = ( # i - # i * ) = ~ , ' Z + ~ i  
ii = P'X, + ui 
and, moreover: 
ii siii> 0 y D:> 0 
0 otherwise 
Here pi picks up the right-hand side term of [22]; i, is the difference 
between the effort in the sector and the effort of the group to belong to 
the sector; #i* is the average value of the productivity by worker for the 
group of sectors with the same ratio ( K / L  ). 
For sectors with a #, smaller than #: we suppose the sector does not 
capture an extra level of effort, and the value in the sample will be zero. 
In this context 0: is an unobserved variable which determine whether 
or not that captioned of effort exists. The model proposed by Cragg is 
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an extension of the Tobit model. In fact, if all the sectors can potentially 
pay wage premia, we are in the Tobit model. 
2.2 The panel data model 
The panel data estimation refers to cross-section data that has been 
pooled over time. Our panel is composed of 24 sectors with an average 
productivity of labour higher than the average of its group2 for all the 
period (1979-1988). In this case, we can follow the same sector 
through this decade. When we move from the single cross-section to 
panel data, the information improves. 
If we introduce the time component in [23], we can write the fixed 
effect model as: 
y;l” = a; + prx;, + u;, 
4, = PUir - 1 + Pi1 
y,’ = a + p‘x, + Uir + &if 
Uir = PUir - 1 + Pir 
The random effect model can be written as: 
where y;,’ is the differences in productivity between the sector and the 
group, Xir is the set of explanatory variables that appear in [22], ai is the 
unobservable specific effect of the sector, ui, is the disturbance term that 
follows an AR1 process, and E;, is a random variable which contains the 
individual specific effects that are constant over time. 
It is possible that we may observe a positive relationship between 
productivity and wages that is unrelated to that embodied in efficiency 
wage consideration. One reason may be a simultaneity bias. If workers 
share rents, for example in “insider-outsider” models of wage determ- 
ination, high productivity in the firm will cause high relative wages. This 
is unlikely to be a problem when interpreting our results because we use 
an internal instrumental variable estimator to account for this difficulty. 
The computer program for panel data that allows for this possibility is 
by Manuel Arellano and Stephen Bond, and will be used for this 
estimation. 
A second reason why the relationship between wages and 
productivity could be positive is the existence of differences in labour 
quality among sectors. The SIE has few variables that reflect labour 
quality, but all the sectors used in the regression have the same proportion 
of blue-collar workers and white-collar workers: the former are some 
eighty percent of the labour force of each sector. 
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Another possibility is that these differences are not observable to the 
econometrician. We attempt to control for this by allowing for a firm- 
specific effect. Another reason why it is unlikely that the effects of 
relative wages on productivity are wholly attributable to unobserved 
skill differences is the fact that inter-industry wage differentials do not 
appear to be explicable in terms of standard human capital consider- 
ation. For example, Krueger and Summer (1986) show that workers 
who switch industries appear to acquire, on average, the wage premium 
attributable to their new industry. 
A common practice is to estimate the first difference form to remove 
the fixed-effect component, and then carry out the estimation by using 
an instrumental variable program where the wage is taken to be 
endogen~us.~ 
3. Basic results 
Our basic results are reported in the tables of Appendix 1. We have 
estimated a Tobit, Probit and truncated model. Through a Probit, we 
can identlfy the sigmficant variables which determine the likelihood that 
a sector pays a wage premium. In a Tobit model, we can also know the 
value of the parameter. 
Cragg’s specification allows the parameters in the implied probit4 
equation to differ completely from those in the Tobit model if the 
complete model is a Probit model for D, and a separate truncated 
regression model for the positive values of Y. 
The Tables 1, 2 and 3 correspond with the results obtained when we 
use the censored sample made with the sectors grouped by the first 
method. 
By the second method, we group the sectors of the SIE following the 
NACE-CLIO classification reported in Table 4. We then make 
subgroups trying to get the small difference between the ( K / L )  ratio 
from the sector and from the group. In Tables 5 ,6  and 7 we show the 
cross-section results obtained by this method. 
In Table 8 we estimate the existence of wage premia throughout 
panel data for the period (1979-88). In t h i s  case, the sample are the 
sectors, grouped by the second method, with an average labour 
productivity higher than the group average for the entire period 
As we can see in Table 1, the estimated parameters from the Tobit 
and Probit model are very similar. Also, the sign of all the parameters 
from one model are equal to the other. In the truncated model, the sign 
1979-1988. 
0 Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini 1995. 
266 Shchez - Urbano - Orti 
Table 1. Estimation for 1979 
Variables Probit Tobit Truncated 
wrl 
wrl2 
a wrl 
vempd 
U 
Log- L 
LRT 5.548 
5.1060 
(0.2475) 
- 0.8522 
(0.43 19) 
- 3.9679 
(0.1660) 
- 0.3016 
(0.42 14) 
- 0.3744 
(0.4791) 
-42.55998 
- 
0.5614 
(0.2475) 
- 0.1474 
(0.431 9) 
- 0.3848 
(0.1660) 
- 0.4003 
(0.4214) 
- 0.4316 
(0.4791) 
16.09127 
0.87978-03 
1.222s 
(0.2433) 
- 0.3730 
(0.456 1 ) 
- 0.9421 
(0.1 733) 
-0.1134 
(0.467 1 ) 
-0.1 134 
(0.4671) 
0.12993 
61.42521 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses; Dependent variable for Tobit and Truncated dmper; 
Dependent variable for Robit D. 
Table 2. Estimation for 1984 
Variables Probit Tobit Truncated 
wrl 
wr12 
awrl 
vempd 
PemPd 
vwrand 
0 
Log-L 
9.1552 
(0.2927) 
- 1.8255 
(0.5725) 
- 6.3559 
(0.2161) 
- 1.0817 
(0.3790) 
-0.3126 
(0.4729) 
- 0.3009 
(0.4279) 
-34.52136 
- 
0.6314 
(0.2927) 
(0.5725) 
(0.2161) 
(0.3790) 
(0.4729) 
(0.4279) 
0.10199 
10.06348 
-0.9101E-01 
- 0.4987 
- 0.4305E-01 
- 0.4036E-0 1 
-0.3726E-01 
~ 
0.1287 
(0.2942) 
- 0.4377 
(0.6254) 
- 0.7628 
(0.2394) 
- 0.2320 
(0.4568) 
- 0.2088 
(0.4200) 
-0.9536E-01 
(0.4709) 
0.17685 
48.95565 
LRT 8.74 
Notes: Same as for Table 1. 
is similar to the Tobit and Probit models for all the variables. With th is 
sample we could not regress the truncated model with the dummy 
w a n d  because when we made the truncation we got a column of zeros. 
Thus we have not reported values for such a variable. 
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Table 3. Estimation for 1988 
Variables Probit Tobit Truncated 
wrl 
wr12 
a wrl 
vempd 
PemPd 
w a n d  
U 
Log-L 
LRT 9.22 
1.9341 
(0.3309) 
0.7219 
(0.696 3) 
- 2.6609 
(0.2454) 
- 0.9098E-01 
(0.4997) 
- 0.2354 
(0.4642) 
-0.6175 
(0.3 107) 
- 39.02429 
- 
0.291 7 
(0.3309) 
0.4170E-02 
(0.6 963) 
- 0.2934 
(0.2454) 
-0.1119E-01 
(0.4997) 
-0.3574E-01 
(0.4642) 
(0.3 107) 
13.42663 
- 0.506 1E-01 
0.9510E-01 
0.8916 
(0.341 1) 
-0.1370 
(0.7610) 
- 0.8862 
(0.2671) 
-0.3708E-01 
(0.502 1 ) 
- 0.2450 
(0.4434) 
- 0.3024 
(0.1690) 
0.13905 
57.06257 
Notes: Same as for Table 1. 
Table 4. Sectoral equivalents for the industrial sectors 
NACE-CLIO R(25) E.I. C.B. CNAE (1974) 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5 .  
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
Metallic, mineral and steel industry 
Minerals and products, no metallics 
Chemical 
Metallics products 
Machinery 
Office machibnery and others 
Electric materials 
Transport materials 
Food industry 
Textile, clothing and shoes 
Paper and derived 
Couch and plastic 
Wood, cork and others 
9-1 1 
12-18 
19,30 
31-35 
36,37 
38,46 
39,40 
4 1-45 
47-64 
65-74 
80-82 
83-84 
75-79 
85-89 
12,14,15 
13,16,17,18,19 
20,23 
24 
25,26* 
33 and 330 CNAE 
27,35,38 
29-32 
35-39 
40-42 
44,45 
46 
43,47 
21,22 
21,22 
25 
31 
32 
33-39 
34,35 
36-38 
41,42 
43-45 
47 
48 
46,49 
*Except for 330 CNAE. 
Source: Cesar Alonso. 
In Table 2 the results for Tobit and Probit are similar but in this case 
the sign of the vempd in the truncated regression is different. In Table 3 
the differences appear in vwrund and wr12 for the truncated model. 
The Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) is included in each table. Since the 
Tobit log-likelihood is simply the sum of the Probit and truncated 
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Table 5. Estimation for 1979 
Variables Probit Tobit Truncated 
wrl 
wr12 
a wrl 
wmpd 
(I 
Log-L 
LRT: 14.93 
5.1212 
(0.261 1) 
0.3304 
(0.4689) 
- 6.1 327 
(0.2226) 
0.4444 
(0.5030) 
0.3952 
(0.4990) 
-41.90555 
- 
0.61 1 1  
(0.26 1 1 ) 
(0.4689) 
(0.2226) 
(0.5030) 
(0.4990) 
19.60443 
- 0.4165E-01 
-0.6383 
-0.6013E-01 
- 0.1 61 3E-01 
0.7537E-01 
1.1 164 
(0.2501 ) 
- 0.9679E-01 
(0.4841) 
- 1.1753 
(0.21 37) 
0.1347 
(0.5039) 
(0.5039) 
68.97978 
- 0.2443E-01 
0.6484E-01 
Nores: Same as for Table 1. 
Table 6. Estimation for 1984 
Variables Probit Tobit Truncated 
wrl 10.110 0.4806 0.3352 
(0.2937) (0.2937) (0.2759) 
wrl2 -0.8415 - 0.1 732E-01 0.1605 
(0.5754) (0.5754) (0.5930) 
a wrl - 9.2659 - 0.4697 - 0.6458 
(0.2448) (0.2448) (0.2446) 
wmpd 0.3276 - 0.71 80E-01 - 0.4345E-01 
(0.3862) (0.3862) (0.3970) 
PemPd -0.3491 -0.2214E-01 - 0.8285E-01 
(0.4990) (0.4990) (0.483 9) 
vwmnd 0.25 14 -0.1153E-01 - 0.2051E-01 
(0.4320) (0.4320) (0.4502) 
0 - 0.7101E-01 0.1 1602 
Log- L - 32.46829 28.48045 64.63094 
LRT 7.36 
Notes: Same as for Table 1. 
regression log-likelihoods, a simple test of the Tobit model as a restric- 
tion on Cragg's model ( y = / ? / a )  can be based on: 2(L0g-d?,~,,+ 
Log-d?,, - Log-Y,oB, ); which will be distributed as a x 2  with 
as many degrees of freedom as the regression has explanatory variables. 
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Table 7. Estimation for 1988 
Variables Probit Tobit Truncated 
wrl 5.7649 0.2392 0.6705E-01 
(0.3443) (0.3443) (0.3455) 
wrl2 0.4156E-01 0.6235E-01 0.1014 
(0.7403) (0.6 963) (0.7968) 
awrl - 6.2273 -0.3387 - 0.1 723 
(0.2917) (0.2917) (0.2974) 
(0.4972) (0.4972) (0.4953) 
(0.3053) (0.3053) (0.2262) 
(I - 0.7 187E-01 0.6904E-0 1 
Log- L -37.13487 26.73926 67.1 9860 
LRT 6.64 
PemPd 0.2445 - 0.341'6~42 - 0.1 888E-01 
vwrand 0.3452 - 0.2837E-03 0.7063E-02 
Norcs: Same as for Table 1. 
Table 8. Estimation of wage premia, 1979-1988 
Variables Inst. variable 
Constant 
dprner ( - 1 ) 
wrl 
vempd 
w u n d  
T 
AK 
K 
T. WALD 
TSARGAN 
-0.119227 
0.084956 
(0.5469) 
0.834219 
(3.2563) 
- 1.350148 
- 0.002998 
0.066807 
( 1.9004) 
0.008901 
(2.326 1) 
- 0.014926 
0.206938 
(2.1 721) 
23.532 (8) 
4.255 (6) 
( - 2.404) 
( - 2.305) 
(-0.171) 
(-0.395) 
Notes: r-student ratios in parentheses. Dependent variable dpmer. 
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The values of the test are smaller than the critical value and thus we can 
conclude that the Tobit model is the appropriate one to estimate 
equation [22]. 
The sign of the variables wrl, awl, vempd and pempd are as expected 
in an efficiency wage framework. On the other hand, the coefficient of 
the dummy variable w u n d  has the opposite sign. 
When we make the ‘regression through the second method we 
observe that the sign of coefficients wrl and awrl are equal to the 
previous estimation for the first method. The values of pempd are the 
opposite of that expected for 1979 and 1988. But in this case vwrund 
has the correct sign for 1984 and 1988. 
In Table 8, we report the results obtained by the regression through 
panel data. We use the model in first differences to eliminate the fixed- 
effect component. The Wald and Sargan tests also appear in this table 
because the DPD program computes them automatically. The Wald test 
is of joint signrficance for all the variables entered in X (a test of the null 
hypothesis that their estimated coefficients are all zero), it is asymptotic- 
ally distributed as x2 with the degrees of freedom provided. The Sargan 
test is related to the validity of the instruments used in the estimation (in 
this case the null hypothesis is that the instruments and the error term 
are orthogonal). As we can see, both have the correct value. 
Both variables wrl and uwrl are significantly different from zero, 
shown in the table. On the other hand, vempd and vwrund have the 
correct sign but we cannot reject the null hypothesis about the 
coefficient of the vempd variable, while vwrund appears sigmficantly 
different from zero at 5% level of significance. 
The coefficients of A K  and K signify respectively the average stock 
of capital by worker for the group and the stock of capital by worker for 
the sector. The sign of these two variables are as expected in equation 
[23]: A K  is insigdicantly different from zero, while K is s i rncant  at 
1 o/o level. 
Through the value of the coefficient K we can obtain 8, and then the 
elasticity of the effort with respect to wrl, a, in equation [24]. The 
elasticity of the effort with respect to the wage is equal to 1.05 which 
means that Solow’s condition is fulfilled. 
Generally, the coefficients of the variables were as expected. The 
positive sign of the wage paid by the sector and the negative sign of the 
average wage of the group indicate that some sectors were paying wage 
premia in the period 1979-1988. In this sense, higher than average 
wages increase the average product of labour above the average. And 
by Solow’s condition we can suggest that the wage paid by the sector is 
an equilibrium wage. 
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The efficiency wage model can explain how the unemployment rate 
can affect the level of production in the short run. We could not obtain 
this data source for the sectors of our sample and thus made the dummy 
variable vempd. 
The relationship between unemployment and effort has to be 
positive in a efficiency wage framework. We have shown that higher 
employment in the sector with respect to the previous year (vempd) is 
negative, which means that, keeping the wage constant, an increase in 
the rate of employment diminished the average productivity of labour; 
in other words, to obtain the same level of effort with higher employ- 
ment the wage has to increase. This fact is illustrated in Figure 3. 
The sign of vwrund is positive, as expected in a sociological model. It 
is worth mentioning that there is some other evidence for the view that, 
if the efficiency wage model is valid, wages in a sector should only 
depend on outside wages and some other variables which influence the 
worker’s effort function. Specifically, wages should not be influenced by 
insider variables like firm-specific demand or technological shocks. 
However, Nickel1 and Wadhwani (1989) report evidence suggesting that 
wages are influenced by such insider variables. This is not consistent 
with the standard efficiency wage models based on shirking, adverse 
Figure 3. Effects on the effort function of an increase in the employment level 
W* 
I 
W* 
0 
W 
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selection or turnover, although it may be consistent with the sociological 
model where workers only work effectively if they believe that the firm 
shares some of its profits with them. 
The sign of pernpd is negative, as corresponds with the predictions of 
the shirking model. When the number of workers is high in one sector, 
and consequently it is more difficult to monitor them on the job, it is 
easier for them to shirk instead of work. Thus, as the percentage of 
workers increases, the possibility of monitoring decreases and also 
clearly the average product of the labour. 
4. Conclusions 
We have found cross-section evidence for the existence of wage 
premia in the industrial sector of the Spanish economy. We have seen 
that average productivity of labour increases when either the relative 
wage or the level of unemployment rises. Moreover, there is support for 
the idea that an increase in the wage paid by the sector increases the 
average productivity of labour. 
When we made the regression with panel data, the basic results 
obtained in the cross-section estimation remained. Thus, the difference 
between the wage paid by the sector and the average wage of the group 
again appear sigdicant. This result is quite important if we think that 
any bargain made in one sector will affect all the sector’s wages in the 
same group. Thus, if relative wages are important for productivity, any 
shock that can affect the high wage sector will produce employment 
adjustment instead of wages. 
It is also possible to explain these results with other theories, for 
example the existence of unobserved human capital. However, it would 
be hard to explain the effect of unemployment on the average product- 
ivity of labour and it would be difficult to rationalize the positive effect 
of an increase in the sectoral wage on productivity, within a standard 
human capital framework. 
Data Appendix 
dpmer is the average product of labour by sector deviated from the 
mean of the average product of labour that we obtain for each group. 
For the construction of this variable we use the Industrial Index Price by 
sector published by INE, and the level of production by sector (before 
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charging the indirect tax) published by the SIE. All the sector with 
productivity below average are substituted by zeros. 
D takes the value 1 if dpmer is strictly bigger than zero, and zero other- 
wise. 
K is the KIL ratio of each sector. 
A K is the average ( K / L  ) ratio for each group of the sample grouped by 
the second method. 
wrl is the real wage by worker (before deducting the direct taxes paid by 
workers) paid for each sector, deviated from the average wage for all the 
sectors. To obtain the real wage we use the Consumption Index Price. 
wr12 is the squared real wage. 
uwrl is the average wage of each group. 
vempd is constructed through the level of employment by sector in 
1989 minus the employment in 1988. We obtain the dummy variable of 
value 1 if the change in employment is positive, zero otherwise. 
vwrund is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the wage has 
increase in the sector, zero otherwise. 
pempd is another dummy variable that takes value 1 if the number of 
workers in the sector is above the average of workers for all the sectors. 
Notes 
I In equilibrium, the elasticity of the effort with respect to the wage is equal to unity. 
*The selection has been done by the second method. 
‘See Blundell(l990) for a good survey of this kind of model. 
For further explanation, see Wadhwani and Wall ( 1988). 
References 
Akerlof G. A. ( 1  982) “Labour Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange”, Quarterly Joumul of 
Akerlof G. A. and Yellen J. L. (1 986) Eficiency Wage Models of the Labour Marker, 
Arellano M. and Bond S. (1  988) “Dynamic Panel Data Estimation Using D P D  A Guide 
Blundell R. ( 1 990) “Lectures in Microeconornetrics”, University College of London. 
Economics 97: 543-569. 
Cambridge University Press. 
for Users”, Institute of Economics and Statistics. 
Q Fonduione Gicomo Brodolini 1995. 
274 Shchez - Urban0 - Otti 
C r a g  J. (1971) “Some Statistical Models for Limited Dependent Variables with 
Gibbons R. and Katz L. (1987) “Unmeasured Ability and Inter-Industry Wage differ- 
Hsiao C. (1986) Analysis ofPanel Data, Cambridge University Press. 
Krueger A. and Summers L. H. (1986) “Efficiency Wages and Inter-Industry Wage 
Murphy K. and Topel R. ( 1  987) Unemployment, Risk and Earnings: Tesfingfor Equaliz- 
Nickel1 S .  J. and Wadhwani S. (1989) “Insider Forces of Wage Determination” WP 334, 
Shapiro C. and Stiglitz J. (1984) “Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline 
Wadhwani S. and Wall M. (1991)”A Direct Test of the Efficiency Wage Model Using UK 
Application to the Demand for Durables Goods”, Econometrica 39: 829-844. 
ences”, NBER. 
Structure”, Econornetrica 56: 259-294. 
ing Wage Differences in fhe Labour Murker, New York: Basil Blackwell. 
CLE, London School of Economics. 
Device”, American Economic Review 74: 433-444. 
Micro-Data”, Oxford Economic Papers 43: 529-548. 
Q Fondarione Giacorno Brodoli 1995. 
